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 Abstract 
Since the Treaty of Maastricht transparency and openness have been prominent catchwords 
to counter the European Union’s (EU) so called ‘democratic deficit’. The working paper 
discusses the rank and position of these principles in democratic theory and looks at their 
realisation at the EU level. Since the EU-bodies equal transparency and openness mainly 
with access to information the paper concentrates on the question, which institution is willing 
to provide best for access to documents. In the course of shaping a new regulation on 
access to documents in May 2001, the contrasting views of Commission, European 
Parliament and Council showed up in their respective draft proposals. The different 
proposals are analysed and assessed with regard to transparency and openness.  
Zusammenfassung 
Seit dem Vertrag von Maastricht dienen die Begriffe “Transparenz” und “Offenheit” als 
beliebte Schlagwörter, um dem sogenannten Demokratiedefizit der Europäischen Union 
(EU) zu begegnen. Das Working Paper widmet sich dem Stellenwert dieser Prinzipien in der 
Demokratietheorie und zeichnet ihre Implementierung auf EU-Ebene nach. Da die EU-
Institutionen Transparenz und Offenheit hauptsächlich mit Zugang zu Informationen 
gleichsetzen, konzentriert sich die Analyse auf die Frage, welche Institution für den 
bestmöglichsten Zugang eintritt. Im Mai 2001 wurde eine neue  Verordnung über den Zugang 
der Öffentlichkeit zu Dokumenten  verabschiedet. Die Vorschläge, die im Vorfeld von 
Kommission, Europäischem Parlament und Rat erstellt wurden, dienen in der vorliegenden 
Arbeit als Grundlage zur Analyse der unterschiedlichen Interpretationen von Transparenz 
und Offenheit.   
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1. Introduction  
Since the early 1990s scholarly debate and political rhetoric has increasingly concentrated 
on the issue of democratization of the European Union. This shift in perspective is mainly 
due to the “organic and evolutionary way” (Westlake 1998: 127) of the Union’s development. 
Along with the increase in communitarized policy fields and a growing number of decisions 
taking place at the European level, the question of legitimacy in the European Union 
substantially gained in importance. Although the single Member States continue to enjoy 
democratic legitimacy of policy-making in the national arena by well-established 
mechanisms, the fusion of national and supranational policies is attended with deficiencies in 
legitimacy. This became obvious with rising popular discontent accompanying the shaping of 
the Maastricht Treaty.  
One of the solutions offered by the European Union to counter the so-called ‘democratic 
deficit’ has been the call for more transparency and openness in the working of the European 
Union’s institutions and the decision-making at the European level. In the EU’s actual steps 
to increase transparency and openness, the notion of these principles has  been mainly 
realized in access to information. ‘An ever closer Union’ where decisions are taken ‘as open 
as possible’ seemed achievable by changing the ways of how to grant citizens access to 
documents. But how open is ‘open as possible’?  
Since the EU equals openness and transparency mainly with access to information the 
relevant provisions may reveal how these principles are implemented. The issue in question 
has been put once more on the EU-agenda recently. Following the obligations of the 
Amsterdam Treaty, the Council in codecision with the European Parliament agreed on a new 
regulation on access to documents in May 2001. Until then, the Commission, the Council, 
and the European Parliament followed fairly the same codes of conduct. However, research 
indicates that the EU bodies interpreted access to documents in different ways (Gronbech-
Jensen 1998). The proposals issued by the Commission, the European Parliament, and the 
Council allow a comparison of the present views on how to define and restrict openness and 
transparency. The analysis will concentrate on the question, which EU-institution is willing to 
provide best for access to information thus providing for democratic legitimacy through 
transparency and openness.  
In the course of this paper transparency and openness will be pinned down to the specific 
instrument of access to documents that is designed to fulfill a specific purpose in a specific 
institutional arrangement. It will be looked at how major players in the framework of the 
European Union aim to fulfill the basic ideas of these catchwords. The first part of the paper 
concentrates on the rank and position of transparency and openness in democratic theory 
and looks at how these principles have evolved and been realized by the main European 
bodies. The second part is devoted to the comparison of the different views of Commission, 2 — Cornelia Moser / How open is ‘open as possible’? — I H S 
 
European Parliament and Council on access to documents. The findings will be finally 
reassessed with regard to the implications on the democratic quality of policy-making in the 
European Union.  
2. The debate on transparency and openness 
The discussion on transparency and openness in the European Union covers a large variety 
of perspectives. In terms of a lack of democratic legitimacy, the two ideas are closely related 
to  an ‘information deficit’ (Lodge 1994). Transparency through information is perceived as a 
major instrument to improve democracy in the EU thus not only taming the secretive nature 
of the Council’s policy-making (Curtin 1995). The Council’s policy has been  proven to be 
disappointing when focusing on special requests for documents (Carvel 1998). Closely 
related to the Council’s information policy in general is its strong position in the 
intergovernmental pillars which consequently renders fields as Justice and Home Affairs 
hardly accessible (de Boer 1998). The Community’s policy is generally discussed highly 
critical hence advocating more transparency, openness, and visibility (Guggenbühl 1998). 
Comparative research has shown that the Community’s standards do  not come up to the 
tradition of the Nordic countries in open government, suggesting the latter as a solution for 
the Union’s problems in legitimacy (Gronbech-Jensen 1998). However, contributions from 
information professionals indicate that access to information has changed for the better 
(Thomson 1998). This is confirmed by historic review pointing out that transparency has 
enormously improved, which is partly due to the impact of an expanded role of the European 
Parliament (Westlake 1998). Transparency is  nowadays seen at the very heart of ‘good 
administration’ (Söderman 2000). The European Ombudsman Jacob Söderman likewise 
focuses on the democratic nature of the principle. The free flow of information and ideas 
between departments could very well further transparent and efficient administration which is 
e.g. in the Commission highly troubled by the fact that different Directorate Generals are in a 
“state of near civil war” (Lord 1998: 83). However, these approaches neglect the internal 
working of an institution and its internal transparency.  
2.1. Defining transparency and openness 
The common denominator of these different approaches is their linking of transparency and 
openness to legitimacy. They are focusing on the transparency of political institutions in their 
relation to civil society, be they private individual or business interest, the media or elected 
representatives. However, definitions of transparency vary among the various approaches 
and stress particular features of the underlying idea. Transparency is viewed and defined 
differently: ranging from a narrow perspective of simple and clear procedures up to as broad 
as “effective popular access to the decision making process” (de Boer 1998: 99). 
Transparency at its simplest is “the ability to look clearly through the windows of an I H S — Cornelia Moser / How open is ‘open as possible’? — 3 
institution” (de Boer 1998: 105). The very idea is made clear by this metaphor: to open up 
the working procedures not immediately visible to those not directly involved in order to 
demonstrate the good working of an institution.  
Adapted to political systems, transparency is a feature in the relationship between ruler and 
ruled, namely by granting “that the operation of the government is sufficiently open to public 
view and simple enough in its essentials that citizens can readily understand how and what it 
is doing” (Dahl 1998: 126). Given these attributes, transparency is usually used along the 
same lines as openness and frequently linked to simplicity and comprehensibility. Openness 
and transparency can also be viewed as slightly different concepts (see Larsson 1998: 40), 
but they are usually equaled since they both refer to a certain quality. So “openness and 
transparency is clearly one and the same thing (…), the activity of lifting the veil of secrecy.” 
(Davis 1998: 121). Transparency and/or openness are seen as a prerequisite for modern 
policy-making by adding the distinctive flavor of democratic legitimacy.  
2.2. Transparency and openness as tools for democratic legitimacy 
When talking about democracy, one should bear in mind the distinction between ideal 
democracy and actual democracy as Robert Dahl (1998: 26) has rightly observed. The first 
provides us with requirements and goals of democracy. The second offers empirical 
evidence given the restrictions of the real world. The latter can then be measured against 
normative demands. Differentiating between these two perspectives may be crucial to 
assess if the assumed democratic tools are suitable to achieve democratic aims and to place 
them in the entirety of democratic practices. A given number of people eager to decide on a 
certain type of polity may have a mixture of diffuse ideas and hopes as well as practical 
considerations of the future polity in mind. Modern large scale democracies have to develop 
institutional arrangements to satisfy democratic criteria, namely effective participation, 
control of the agenda, voting equality, full inclusion, and enlightened understanding (Dahl 
1998: 85). 
In the course of legitimizing the emerging EU polity, transparency has been a prominent 
catchword designated to stand as one of the principles capable of rendering the European 
Union more democratic. Interesting enough, the debate over transparency has mainly been 
inspired by practical steps whereas “democratic theory has very little to say in this field” 
(Larson 1998: 40). Transparency and openness are in general linked to individual rights as 
e.g. freedom of speech, freedom of press, or the right to vote, but the principles are not at 
the very heart of democratic theory. However, “classical and contemporary theories of 
democracy are posited on the belief that secrecy menaces democracy, follows philosophy of 
a totalitarian state” (Curtin 1998: 107). Opening up the legislative and executive procedures 
is an essential for democratic policy making. Subsequently, what people learn by using these 
open and comprehensible channels may help them in participating in policy making. It is in 4 — Cornelia Moser / How open is ‘open as possible’? — I H S 
 
this sense one means to achieve legitimacy according to a modern understanding of 
democracy in a bundle of mechanisms. Transparency and openness are instruments to 
satisfy democratic criteria, especially the ability for citizens to participate in governance and 
to hold leaders accountable.  
Different ideal models of democracy highlight different democratic qualities inherent in 
transparency and openness. Traditional representative democracy mainly stresses that 
transparency allows and simplifies accountability and control of rulership. This is well 
illustrated by describing transparency as follows: “[t]hus it must not be so complexly 
constructed that citizens can readily understand how and, because they do not understand 
their government, cannot readily hold their leaders accountable, particularly at elections” 
(Dahl 1998: 126). The basic idea is that power corrupts. Those equipped with the means for 
leadership should therefore be observed and scrutinized. Control is necessary in democratic 
systems and “essentially about preventing abuses by those we have chosen to govern us” 
(Verhoeven 2000: 2). 
Participatory and d eliberative approaches offer a slightly different perspective by assuming 
that transparency and openness promote a vivid civil society. “The reason why information 
should be open and accessible in any democracy worthy of its name is to enable political 
participation by citizens” (Curtin 1998: 110). This approach obliges the political elites to grant 
openness in order “to create channels for the people enabling them to participate in the work 
of the government” (Larsson 1998: 41). A democratic government has to be based on public 
deliberation and has to dissociate from the idea of policy-making in closed circles. Access 
and subsequently participation are in this line of thinking crucial, taking it for granted that 
“openness in government cannot be limited to  forms of parliamentary control but must 
include a wide range of mechanisms enabling participation of citizens in the policy process 
by means of an effective access to the process and voice within it” (Verhoeven 2000:5). 
Both approaches basically rely on access to information as a tool to achieve transparency 
and openness. Access to information plays a central role: 
Information and the availability or accessibility of information is and remains the currency of 
democracy. Without an adequate flow of information even ex post facto accountability of the 
governors to the people is meaningless. It is regarded as essential to the democratic process 
that individuals are able to understand the decision-making process and the means by which 
the decision-makers have reached their conclusions in order to effectively evaluate 
government policies and actions and to be able to choose their representatives intelligently. 
An equally important objective of openness in democratic government is to enhance public 
confidence in the government (Curtin 1998: 107). 
Apart from these two approaches that heavily rely on democratic justifications, a third can be 
identified. It is rather concerned with the restrictions to transparency due to conflicting I H S — Cornelia Moser / How open is ‘open as possible’? — 5 
values, namely efficiency. “Although it is certainly important that the public have access to 
relevant information about administration, working in a goldfish bowl can rarely be as 
efficient as working in private” (Peters 1995: 297). The basic assumption stresses that policy-
making is mainly about positive outcomes for a given population. Too much openness may 
hamper negotiations and may “lead to attitudes of legalism and risk aversion” (Verhoeven 
2000: 2). This view focuses on the bargaining character of policy-making. The very character 
of  political trade-offs makes it necessary to withhold information for some time. In order to 
achieve the best possible outcome, information can be used when appropriate in the 
deliberative processes. So openness as legitimizing positive quality is weakening  efficiency 
as a legitimizing quality.  
Even if efficiency is not given priority over transparency, openness is never an absolute 
category in the actual shaping of political systems. Actual democratic practice has to take 
into account that there may be other conflicting values, e.g. the right to privacy of individuals. 
Moreover, different political systems have created different degrees of openness over time. 
The variety of diverse regulations in the 15 EU Member States illustrates that a broad 
spectrum of a ctual regulations within both democratic and efficient political systems is 
possible. Transparency and openness are neither a dependent nor an independent variable, 
“[a] certain type of government and a certain type of institutional arrangement will produce a 
certain type of openness on the one hand, but on the other hand a certain type of openness 
will affect the institutional setting” (Larsson 1998: 44).  
3. Transparency and openness in the European Union 
Neither democracy nor transparency was on the agenda of the early European Community 
for Coal and Steal. As Carvel puts it, the “EEC were a benevolent conspiracy by the elites of 
Europe to bind their peoples and stop another war” (Carvel 1998: 56). Cooperation between 
European nation states resembled an i nternational regime with diplomatic negotiations 
prevailing. However, things changed with the growing communitarization of European 
policies. The shift in power relations and the evolvement of a new style of policy-making with 
intermingling national and supranational levels cast shadow on usual ways how to handle 
EU politics. Democratic and transparent decision-making would have been an alienated idea 
in diplomatic interaction but was seen as an adequate answer to the increase in popular 
discontent over the development of the European Union.  
The growing discrepancies due to the changes in policy making showed up in many areas 
and were also highlighted with regard to access to information. In September 1992 the Dutch 
Member of Parliament, Alman Metten, asked a Dutch ministry to hand over documents 
concerning various ECOFIN-meetings which he considered important for his parliamentary 
work. He referred to the Dutch law granting openness and argued that “Council deliberations 6 — Cornelia Moser / How open is ‘open as possible’? — I H S 
 
and decisions (...) should be subject to the law on openness, otherwise a growing area of 
formerly transparent policy and decision-making will be brought out of reach of the law of 
openness as well as that of democratic control.” (Metten 1998: 86f) After lengthy 
deliberations the Netherlands finally refused in 1995 to release the documents stating that 
the Community’s concerns and needs were in this case prior to national law. 
Issues of legitimacy had long been up to the single Member State, but it seemed to become 
increasingly important to i nclude related commitments and provisions in the acquis 
communitaire. Transparency and Openness came first on the agenda in the early 1990s. On 
15 December 1991 declaration No. 17 attached to the Maastricht Treaty confirmed, “the 
Conference considers that  transparency of the decision-making process strengthens the 
democratic nature of the institutions and the public’s confidence in the administration” (cit. a. 
Lodge 1994: 349). Transparency was used as a handy answer to rising popular concern of 
what was going on at the European level. Given the qualities of transparency, one can only 
admire the audacity to put transparency on the EU agenda ever. Decision-making had by 
then already gained increased impact and complexity. To render the EU decision-making 
process open, simple and therefore understandable seems a rather risky goal. 
Nevertheless, this presumed remedy of the so called ‘democratic deficit’ was particularly 
promoted by the Member States which did not want to trouble themselves to discuss the 
practices of the Council and the implications of a substantial shift in decision making away 
from the national level. The addressee was first of all the Commission, which was frequently 
referred to as “byzantine, inaccessible and an affront to the conduct of democratic politics” 
(see Lodge 1994: 345). Attacking the Commission and calling for more openness had 
unintended consequences. Involuntarily, the discussion and subsequent measures to 
enhance transparency and openness brought into light again the rather obscure procedures 
of the Council’s internal working and decision-making.  
When France almost rejected the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty in its 1992 referendum 
and the Danes also refused to give consent in the first referendum, increasing concern 
focused on the people’s interest in the project “European Union.” Along with frequent 
reference to democracy and subsidiarity as adequate tools to meet the people’s demands, 
the notion of transparency was introduced. A firmly declaration stressed the aim to create „an 
ever closer union among the peoples of Europe, in which decisions are taken as openly as 
possible and as closely as possible to the citizen” (Article 1 (A) TEU). Transparency was 
subsequently transposed into the specific instrument of access to documents with Article 255 
(191a) saying that 
1. Any citizen of the Union, and any natural or legal person residing or having its registered 
office in a Member State, shall have a right of access to European Parliament, Council and 
Commission documents, subject to the principles and the conditions to be defined in 
accordance with paragraphs 2 and 3. I H S — Cornelia Moser / How open is ‘open as possible’? — 7 
2. General principles and limits on grounds of public or private interest governing this right of 
access to documents shall be determined by the Council, acting in  accordance with the 
procedure referred to in Article 251 within two years of the entry into force of the Treaty of 
Amsterdam. 
3. Each institution referred to above shall elaborate in its own Rules of Procedure specific 
provisions regarding access to its documents. 
The distinctive status of the Council was acknowledged in Article 207 leaving it up to its will 
to decide whether documents touched its role as legislator or not. Article 207 (151) specified 
for the Council that  
4. The Council shall adopt its Rules of Procedure. For the purpose of applying Article 255(3), 
the Council shall elaborate in these Rules the conditions under which the public shall have 
access to Council documents. For the purpose of this paragraph, the Council shall define the 
cases in w hich it is to be regarded as acting in its legislative capacity, with a view to allowing 
greater access to documents in those cases, while at the same time preserving the 
effectiveness of its decision making process. In any event, when the Council acts in  its 
legislative capacity, the results of votes and explanations of vote as well as statements in the 
minutes shall be made public.  
The introduction of the right to information in the context of internal rules of procedure has 
provoked critical remarks (see e.g. Curtin 1998:112). The Dutch government, which regarded 
the right to information as a fundamental right, lodged a plea with the European Court of 
Justice (Case 58/94), but was eventually repudiated. It was therefore up to the body’s 
internal code of conduct how to shape transparency.  
Following the Treaty’s obligations, the different EU bodies made up their own regulations on 
access to documents. The Council adopted a code of conduct concerning public access to 
Council and Commission documents in December 1993, which was adopted by the 
Commission in February 1994. The European Parliament implemented a similar system in 
1997. Moreover, the Treaty of Amsterdam fixed that a regulation on access to documents of 
all three bodies should be adopted under the codecision procedure within two years of entry 
into force of the Amsterdam Treaty.  
None of the bodies has committed itself to absolute transparency. The Commission’s and the 
Council’s code of conduct listed several exceptions including public interest, individual 
privacy, commercial and industrial secrecy as well as the Community’s financial interests. 
Access to documents was likewise denied if requested by the supplier, were it a Member 
State or another third party. Documents also remained confidential if the EU-body claimed an 
interest in the confidentiality of the proceedings. The European Parliament decided to refuse 
access to documents of certain parliamentary meetings in order to protect the confidentiality 8 — Cornelia Moser / How open is ‘open as possible’? — I H S 
 
of deliberations of political groups. The rather narrow definition of the Commission and the 
Council has been challenged on various occasions. The subsequent judgments of the 
European Courts and the investigations of the European Ombudsman can be regarded as 
an invitation to reconsider the practice of the institutions.  
Most of the refusals to grant access referred to the confidentiality of the proceedings. In 
Guardian versus Council (Case T –194/94) the English newspaper demanded documents 
concerning Justice and Agricultural Councils without success. The decision of the Court of 
First Instance turned the Council’s position down and ordered the release of these 
documents. Moreover, it stressed the necessity of an accurate balancing test guaranteeing 
that the interest of citizens to get hold of documents should be carefully examined against 
the needs of internal proceedings. The same idea was expressed in WWF UK versus 
Commission (Case T –105/95). The Court conceded that certain documents out of a bundle 
might be withhold but that those which failed the balancing test should be handed over to the 
applicant. The discrepancies between Member State’s practice and the Council’s position 
were again highlighted when Swedish journalists demanded documents relating to Europol. 
Sweden handed over 18 out of 20 documents, the Council only 4. The Swedish journalists 
lodged a plea before the Council of First Instance (Svenska Journalistförbundet versus 
Council, T –174/95) and the Court finally annulled the Council’s decision for not sufficiently 
reasoning the refusal. Generally, the judgments of the European Court suggest a careful 
examination of requests on a case-by-case basis. Moreover, the Court has frequently taken 
the side of applicants who were denied access to documents by the EU institutions. Its 
judgments therefore have “broadened the scope of access rights” (Verhoeven 2000: 9).  
Another way to reassess the interpretations of the rules of conduct is by complaining to the 
European Ombudsman. He has been installed to serve as an intermediary between single 
citizens and the European Union. Transparency and access to information is one of the 
major tasks of the Ombudsman. His own-initiated inquiry aimed to close the loophole in 
Article 255, which covers only the Commission, the Council, and the European Parliament. 
The Ombudsman’s inquiry included 15 EU institutions and bodies and suggested 
improvements regarding access to documents. Although his inquiries lack the virtue of law 
the conclusions of the Ombudsman have some impact given the very nature of the office. 
Complaints to the Ombudsman on transparency concern most of all the infringement 
procedure, recruitment procedures and access to documents (see Söderman 2000). The 
Ombudsman was also used to defy the Council’s restrictive dealing with documents 
concerning the  Third Pillar. Frequent requests on documents made by a British Journalist on 
behalf of the human rights organization “StateWatch” had frequently been refused.  
Since the emergence of the transparency theme access to information on EU politics has 
substantially improved. Thanks to the use of electronic media, the lack of information on the 
EU bodies and their working has been enormously reduced. Many bodies and institutions 
nowadays offer registers of documents. Press releases, minutes and previews of the agenda I H S — Cornelia Moser / How open is ‘open as possible’? — 9 
are readily available. However, comprehensive information on the working of the EU at large 
or thematic information sheets rather highlight the service-orientated character of an 
institution than stressing the frequently proclaimed democratic upgrading by adding 
transparency. Likewise, the very idea of broadcasting Council meetings may promote the 
understanding of EU policy-making, the actual programs are rather uninformative and 
moreover, “flavored with propaganda” (Guggenbühl 1998: 24). “Enlightened  understanding” 
as a democratic criteria channeled through the intermediaries of an active civil society will 
not be achieved by this means. 
4. Transparency and openness in comparison 
The debate on the new regulation regarding public access to European Parliament, Council 
and Commission documents gave the opportunity to analyze the current positions of the 
three EU-bodies with regard to transparency and openness. The comparison works on the 
assumption that access to information strengthens democratic legitimacy. If everybody has 
access to each single document drawn up in the public administration as well as to those 
documents worked out during legislative policy-making, transparency and openness are 
maximized. Criteria for assessing the differences and similarities between the positions of 
the EU-bodies are the question of who has access to what documents under which 
conditions. However, the very nature of the EU polity causes scenarios, which go beyond the 
scope of the analysis. Since legislation on access to information vary among the Member 
States, an upgrading of access on the EU-level might override provisions on the national 
level. Extensive access to documents on grounds of the new regulation could then lead to an 
upgrading of transparency in some Member States while at the same time weakening the 
right to information in others, namely the Nordic countries. The question of how to deal with 
the so-called “Third party”-documents, which includes those of Member States, will be 
therefore touched, too.  
Transparency and openness by means of access to information are frequently linked to 
accountability and participation but actual democratic practice illustrates that access to 
documents is always limited in one way or the other. Yet, not only the institutional 
arrangement but also the nature of the institutions itself is shaping the degree of openness 
and transparency. Along the lines of how much transparency may possibly be granted, the 
institutional view will define how access is granted under which conditions, what kind of 
information is accessible and why access is granted or denied. The institution’s culture, its 
self-perception, and its inherent institutional targets will influence the degree of openness, 
which is consequently defended against conflicting and concurrent positions.  10 — Cornelia Moser / How open is ‘open as possible’? — I H S 
 
4.1. Foci of the three proposals on the regulation of access to 
documents 
In accordance with the EC-Treaty obligations Article 251(2) and 255(2) the Commission 
issued a proposal for public access to documents of the Council, the Commission and the 
European Parliament. The Commission proposal (COM (2000) 30 final/2) of 21 February 
2000 was forwarded to both Parliament and Council.  
The European Parliament primarily dealt with the new regulation in several meetings of the 
Committee on Citizens’ Freedoms and Rights, Justice and Home Affairs, which considered 
opinions of other committees, too. The Committee adopted its draft legislative resolution on 
24 October 2000 by 28 votes to 4, with 2 abstentions and made it available to the public 
(Doc. No. A5–0318/2000). This draft would have been subject to the vote in plenary session, 
which was eventually postponed in order to open up informal meetings with both 
Commission and Council.  
Somewhat different and highly indicative is the proceeding  in the Council, which dealt with 
the regulation in various sessions of the COREPER working group on information under 
subsequent the Portuguese, the French and the Swedish presidency. Common positions are 
much more difficult to find since the positions of  each of the 15 Member States has to be 
considered. Access to documents is subject to a wide range of implementation forms in 
respective national legislation. Differences with regard to Member States legislation cover 
the whole range between narrow definitions of openness and a very extensive practice in 
granting access to documents. A review of national legislations shows that e.g. Great Britain 
makes extensive use of the so-called secrecy act thus withdrawing official documents from 
public scrutiny. On the opposite, the Nordic countries have long times practiced the open 
government approach. The adoption of a common position at the General Affairs Committee 
meeting was tabled for the end of November, then postponed to January 2001. The Swedish 
Presidency’s  working paper of that meeting which is the basis for comparison still reflects 
internally unsettled issues.  
The obvious difficulties to find a compromise provoked a substantial delay in the adoption of 
the new legislation. A series of informal “trilogue m eetings” started at the end of January 
2001 and was concluded with a compromise. The regulation was finally adopted on 30 May 
2001 (Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001).  
The Commission’s proposal stresses in its recitals the necessity to broaden transparency 
and openness, thus enabling “citizens to participate more closely in the decision-making 
process, and guarantees that the administration enjoys greater legitimacy and is more 
effective and more accountable vis-à-vis the citizen in a democratic system” (Comm, recital 
2). It reaffirms this commitment by reminding of the European Councils of Birmingham, 
Edinburgh and Copenhagen, which extensively dealt with transparency. The prime I H S — Cornelia Moser / How open is ‘open as possible’? — 11 
addressee of the regulation is therefore “the citizen.” Despite this commitment, the making of 
the Commission’s proposal has provoked criticism for not involving representatives of civil 
society. The European Committee of the British House of Lords judged that “[a]n important 
political opportunity was missed. Extensive external consultation would have demonstrated 
commitment to openness. It might have gone some way to restore to the institution some of 
the legitimacy and credibility it lost with the collapse of the Santer Commission.”
1 However, 
the draft confirms the will to shape the European Union as a democratic system. The 
principle of openness shall guarantee civic participation and accountability. 
Apart from the rights of Member States, the scope of the Parliament’s regulation is much 
broader than that of the Commission. Specific rules on access only stay in force if they 
provide more access. The parliament intends an extensive approach including remarks on 
future provisions on access to documents: “On the same basis, the present regulation is the 
legal framework for existing and future interinstitutional agreements in relation to methods of 
drafting laws, content and format of the Official Journal, managing and storing documents 
with a view to granting access, and guidelines on the rules on modalities for access to 
documents” (EP, recital 3).  
With regard to the principal motivation of the regulation on access to documents this draft 
shows other focal points. The proposal makes reference to the acquis communitaire and 
declaration 17 as well as the Charta of Fundamental Rights. It stresses in its justification to 
recital 0 that “[a] truly democratic debate cannot develop in the European Union without open 
institutions” and promotes the right of information. Transparency through access to 
documents suffices another principle by granting p rotection “against the arbitrary use of and 
the abuse of power and against corruption and fraud” (EP, recital 2). The draft is clearly 
aimed at the citizen and the general public.  
The Council’s working paper issued under Swedish presidency
2 reflects a rapprochement 
between the Member States and makes some concessions to the European Parliament’s 
draft. The position of the Council diverges however from those of Commission and the 
European Parliament. The draft confirms in its recitals the principle of openness and 
transparency as a means to achieve greater legitimacy, effectiveness and accountability. It 
follows the Commission’s wording in saying that “[o]penness enables citizens to participate 
more closely in the decision-making process and guarantees that the administration enjoys 
greater legitimacy and is more effective and more accountable to the citizen in a democratic 
system” (Council, recital 2). The aim is “to widen access to documents as far as possible” 
                                                 
1
  House of Lords, European Communities Committee, Sixteenth Report: Public Access to EU Documents, HL 
102; 1 August 2000  
2
  None of the working papers and drafts of the Council was accessible through the Council's register of 
documents. However, several documents were played into the hands of the British human rights organization 
StateWatch which made them available to the public via Internet (www.statewatch.org) 12 — Cornelia Moser / How open is ‘open as possible’? — I H S 
 
(Council, recital 4). However, the Council makes special reference to Article 255(3) in 
proclaiming that Council’s documents concerning legislative issues should be more 
accessible “while at the same time preserving the effectiveness of their decision-making 
process” (Council, recital 6).  
4.2. Transparency in perspective 
Getting information is a way of empowerment in terms of democratic citizenship. Access to 
documents therefore centers on the question how much access is granted. This includes 
definitions of those who benefit as well as procedures on access. Another important criterion 
is the scope of access. The accessibility of documents refers both to the stage in the policy-
making cycle as well as to policy fields. A rather special case due to the nature of the 
European Union has to be considered, too. The multi-level system offers multiple points of 
access, notably the EU-institutions and the Member States. The question of how to deal 
judicially with this configuration cannot be assessed in terms of more or less access since 
national provisions vary. Whether Member States have the final say in the disclosure of 
documents originating from a nation state or not rather touches the question of weakening 
the Member States or strengthening the European Union’s impact. 
4.2.1. Beneficiaries of the regulation 
The provision on who should be entitled to access shows little divergences. Beneficiaries 
shall be all Union citizens, all enterprises having their office within the territory of the EU, and 
all legal residents. The Parliament’s as well as the Council’s drafts exceed this right to non-
EU natural or legal persons although the wording indicates that this right is not enforceable. 
This is a slight but however important improvement towards more openness since namely 
accession states may have a strong interest to get hold of certain EU-documents. All three 
proposals in principle agree that no reason has to be given by the applicant as far as his 
specific interest is concerned. However, only the European Parliament’s position is without 
reservation: “The institution concerned may ask the applicant for further details regarding the 
application” (Comm, par. 5.1). A similar wording is used in the Councils respective paragraph 
(Council, par. 3A(2)). The wording of both the Commission’s and the Council’s proposal open 
a backdoor to revise this principle, whereas the Parliament’s draft defines rather narrowly 
that asking back is only possible “for the purposes of identifying the documents” (EP, par. 
5.1). The European Parliament’s draft does not mention large documents  or repeated 
requests whereas both Commission and Council consider these cases and make specific 
provisions. A specific rule applies in case of large documents or repeated requests. The 
Council follows the suggestions of the Commission saying that “[i]n the event of general and 
repetitive applications or applications relating to very large documents or a very large 
number of documents, the institution concerned may confer with the applicant informally, 
with a view to finding a fair solution” (Council, par. 3a(3)). I H S — Cornelia Moser / How open is ‘open as possible’? — 13 
Speeding up the process of application is seen as a citizen-orientated approach by the 
Parliament. Whereas the Commission sets a time limit of one month to reply to an initial 
application, the Parliament’s approach reduces the answering time to two  weeks and 
demands to hand over at the same time the requested documents in case of a positive 
decision (EP, par. 5.2). The Council’s draft expresses its commitment that applications “shall 
be handled promptly” (Council, par 5.1), but leans on the Commission’s position of a 
deadline for response limited to one month. 
As far as requests for documents are concerned, each draft foresees in its paragraph 5 a 
fairly similar procedure. If the application is not accepted, the applicant is entitled to make a 
confirmatory request. If this request is turned down, the institution has to inform about 
possible remedies, namely a complaint to the Ombudsman or the lodging of the complaint 
with the European Court of Justice. The Council’s proposal foresees however that 
“[c]onfirmatory applications for sensitive documents shall be handled only by those persons 
who have a right to acquaint themselves with those documents according to the internal 
rules of the institution concerned” (Council, par. 6(1)). The European Parliament  takes a 
somehow different view by demanding, “[p]arliamentary scrutiny of all documents excluded 
from public access shall be assured by regularly informing a body of the European 
Parliament” (EP, par. 7). 14 — Cornelia Moser / How open is ‘open as possible’? — I H S 
 
Table 1: Beneficiaries of access to documents according to EU-institution’s drafted 
positions 
  Commission  Parliament  Council 
BENEFICIARIES 
& PROCEDURE 
Natural and legal 
persons within EU-
territory 
Natural and legal 
persons worldwide 
Natural and legal 
persons worldwide  
Reservation  no reason has to be 
given, but: institution 
may ask for further 
details 
no reason has to be 
given 
no reason has to be 
given; but: institution 
may ask for further 
details 
Reservation  special treatment for 
large document or 
repeated request  
no provision  special treatment for 
large document or 
repeated request  
Time  time-limit of one month   time-limit of two weeks   time-limit of one month  
Remedies  Two stage procedure 
and possibility to 
appeal to Ombudsman 
or European Court  
Two stage procedure 
and possibility to 
appeal to Ombudsman 
or European Court  
Two stage procedure 
and possibility to 
appeal to Ombudsman 
or European Court  
 
4.2.2. Proactive measures 
In its efforts to shape the regulation on access as an overall guideline on the future access to 
information, the European Parliament’s proposal embraces the detailed handling of registers, 
unlike the Commission’s initial draft. Although many bodies and institutions of the European 
Union already offer registers accessible by the Internet, the European Parliament sets great 
store of regulating this point specifically and incorporates a proactive approach to information 
on documents. It suggests therefore the installation of a register for each institution. These 
have to include at a minimum “all documents created by that institution in the course of a 
procedure for the adoption of legally binding measures, notably all proposals, opinions, 
working documents, agendas, documents for discussion at formal meetings, minutes, 
declarations and positions of Member States” (EP, par. 9a(3)). The register has to list those 
documents that are excluded from access indicating reasons for exclusion (EP, par. 9a(2)). 
Apart from that, these documents have to be incorporated in the public register from the 
moment of time a decision has been made or at the moment a document is sent to others 
like third parties, institutions or internal bodies (EP, par 9a(1)). Whenever possible I H S — Cornelia Moser / How open is ‘open as possible’? — 15 
documents shall be available directly thus creating registers as an interface between the 
institutions and citizens.  
The Council follows this approach by stating that this would “make the citizens’ rights arising 
from this Regulation effective” (Council par. 9a(1)). Differing from the EPs position the 
Council simply demands a short description of the content. A huge difference shows up in 
the treatment of documents subject to exceptions: “Reference shall not be made if disclosure 
of the reference could undermine the protection of information provided for in Article 4” 
(Council, par. 9a(2)). Sensitive documents are excluded likewise.  
Table 2: Proactive measures in access to documents according to EU-institution’s 
drafted positions 
  Commission  Parliament  Council 
PROACTIV 
MEASURES 
Access to registers 
shall be provided 
Register shall include 
reference to all 
documents as soon 
as they are sent to 
another body or a 
decision is taken, 
documents falling 
under exceptions 
have to be listed, 
documents shall be 
accessible directly 
Registers shall be 
established,  
no reference if this 
could harm protection 
as granted by the 
exceptions,  
no reference to any 
sensitive documents 
 
4.2.3. Scope of the regulation 
The regulation is intended to encompass “all documents held by an institution, that is to say, 
documents drawn up by it or received from third parties and in its possession, in all areas of 
activity of the European Union” (Council, par. 1(2)). The European Parliament makes a point 
in stressing that ‘all areas’ refers to the 2nd and 3rd pillar as well. The Council agrees on that 
with certain reservations stating that sensitive documents shall get a special treatment.  
Commission, Parliament and Council are generous as far as the type of medium is 
concerned. Written as well as electronic or sound, visual or audiovisual-recorded information 
may be requested. Generosity stops here, and the approaches to exceptions vary 
significantly in various fields. In case of the future EU-regulation, the European Parliament 
offers the smallest number of exceptions. The draft foresees that access to documents can 
be denied if disclosure could significantly undermine public security, monetary stability, 16 — Cornelia Moser / How open is ‘open as possible’? — I H S 
 
defense and military matters, and vital interest relating to the EU’s international relations (EP, 
par. 4(1a)). Individual privacy is likewise protected. Commercial secrecy is mentioned under 
the European Parliament’s exceptions, too, but has to be balanced against private or public 
interest in case of disclosure. However, the European Parliament sets certain limits to the 
protection by demanding that a classification is done immediately and shall be limited in 
time. If access is denied for an unlimited period of time, the reason for withholding has to be 
revised regularly (EP, par. 3a(2)).  
The Commission’s initial proposal gives a much longer and detailed list of exceptions 
including “the effective functioning of the institutions” (Comm, par. 4(1a)). This draft does not 
require a “balancing test” as the European Parliament’s proposal does. The Council’s 
position is similar to that of the Commission, but is outstanding in stating “[a]ccess to a 
document which relates to a matter where the decision has not been taken by the Institutions 
may be denied if its disclosure could seriously undermine the Institution’s decision-making 
process, unless it is clearly in the public interest to disclose the document” (Council, par. 
4.2). 
The Commission suggests likewise excluding “texts for internal use such as discussion 
documents, opinions of departments, and excluding informal messages” (Comm par. 3a). 
The two other concurrent drafts take also account of the so-called ‘space to think’ clause. 
The Parliament’s draft limits its exceptions however to documents intended for exchange of 
idea and brainstorming. The ‘space to think’ is limited to “informal information in the form of 
written messages which serves the provision of  personal opinion or the free exchange of 
ideas (“brain storming”) within the institutions” (EP, par. 3a). The Council’s proposal 
resembles the approach of the Commission in its subsequent paragraph, excluding 
documents “for internal use as part of preliminary consultations and deliberations within the 
institutions such as discussion documents, unfinished documents or draft documents and 
documents whose content reflects personal opinions” (Council, par. 3a). The European 
Parliament chooses obviously the most restrictive wording, but leaves broad space for future 
interpretation, too. 
Another source of divergence is the definition of those bodies subject to the proposed 
regulation. Following the obligations of the Amsterdam Treaty, access to documents of the 
Council, the European Parliament and the Commission has to be considered. The Council’s 
draft makes no further provisions on that subject. Both Commission and EP define the 
respective bodies more precisely. The EP mentions the “internal and subsidiary bodies (such 
as Parliament Committees, Council Committees, Working Groups and Commission 
Directorates-General)” (EP, par. 3b). The Commission’s draft is even more precise, citing 
each body and the main subbodies (Comm, par. 3c,d,e). It also views the EP’s  political 
groups within the reach of the regulation, a provision that is missing in the EP’s draft.  I H S — Cornelia Moser / How open is ‘open as possible’? — 17 
Table 3: Scope of access to documents according to EU-institution’s drafted positions 
  Commission  Parliament  Council 
SCOPE  all documents held by 
an institution (drawn 
up or received) 
all documents held by 
an institution (drawn 
up or received) 
all documents held by 
an institution (drawn 
up or received) 
Medium  written as well as 
electronic or sound, 
visual or audiovisual 
recording  
written as well as 
electronic or sound, 
visual or audiovisual 
recording  
written as well as 
electronic or sound, 
visual or audiovisual 
recording 
Accessible 
documents up  
to subject  
Exclusion on grounds 
of 
-  public security, 
-  defence and 
international 
relations, 
-  relations between 
and/or with the 
Member States or 
Community or 
non-Community 
institutions, 
-  financial or 
economic 
interests, 
-  monetary stability, 
-  the stability of the 
Community’s legal 
order, 
-  court proceedings, 
-  inspections, 
investigations and 
audits, 
-  infringement 
proceedings, 
including the 
preparatory stages 
thereof, 
-  the effective 
functioning of the 
institutions 
 
privacy 
business interest 
Exclusion on grounds 
of  
-  public security, 
-  monetary stability, 
-  defence and 
military matters 
-  vital interest 
relating to the 
EU’s international 
relations  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
privacy 
business interests 
(balancing test) 
Exclusion on grounds 
of  
-  public security; 
-  defence and 
military matters; 
-  international 
relations; 
-  relations between 
a Member State 
and an institution 
of the Community, 
or between the 
institutions of the 
Community and 
non-Community 
institutions; 
-  the financial, 
monetary or 
economic policy of 
the Community or 
a Member State; 
-  court proceedings; 
-  efficiency of 
inspections, 
investigations and 
audits; 
-  infringement 
proceedings, 
including the 
preparatory stages 
thereof 
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Accessible 
documents up  
to pillar 
No specific provision, 
no overruling of 
existing rules of 
access 
Documents in all 
areas of activity 
including 2nd and 3rd 
pillar, overruling of 
existing rules granting 
less access 
Documents in all 
areas of activity 
including 2
nd and 3rd 
pillar, but special 
procedure for 
sensible documents 
Accessible 
documents up  
to stage 
Possibility to protect 
internal documents 
Possibility to protect 
informal information 
(“Harm test”) 
Possibility to protect 
documents if no 
decision has been 
taken ( “Harm test”) 
Accessible 
documents up  
to holder 
Documents held by 
the three institutions 
and those of internal 
bodies 
Documents held by 
the three institutions 
and those of present 
and future internal 
bodies and agencies 
accountable to them 
No specific provision 
 
4.2.4. Documents involving 3rd parties 
A special point due to the nature of the EU polity is the insertion of provisions concerning 
third parties. Whereas the definition of third parties remains the same for all three proposals 
saying that ‘third party’ shall mean “any natural or legal person, or any entity outside the 
institution, including the Member States,  other Community and non-Community institutions 
and bodies and non-member countries” (Comm, par. 3f, EP, par. 3f, Council, par. 3c), the 
question of how to handle documents originating from third parties is contested. The crucial 
point is, of course, the role of the Member States. The Commission suggests to grant 
confidentiality according to the preferences of a Member State (Comm, par. 3d) and to apply 
the regulation only for documents sent to the institutions after entry in force of the regulation 
(Comm, par. 2 (1)). The European Parliament turns down this approach fearing an 
undermining of the future regulation. It therefore suggests that Member States and other 
third parties shall indicate reasons for withholding on the grounds of the exceptions laid 
down in the EU-regulation on public access. The institution even has the right to decide 
against the wishes of the third party but is at the same time under obligation to grant a 
certain space of time to give the opportunity to search for legal intervention (EP, par. 4c). The 
Council’s definite position on this point was not a vailable for comparative analysis. In the 
recital it is however laid down that Declaration No 35 attached to the Final Act of the Treaty 
“will allow a Member State to request the Commission or the Council not to communicate to 
third parties a document originating from that State without its prior agreement” (Council, 
recital 9). I H S — Cornelia Moser / How open is ‘open as possible’? — 19 
Another possible scenario for request is not covered by the Commission’s proposal although 
it has proven to be a touchstone between the Community institutions and a Member State. 
The case of Sweden, releasing more documents under its presidency than the Council, has 
highlighted the problematic nature of divergent information policies. The European 
Parliament provides in this case that “the Member State shall immediately inform the 
institution” (EP, par. 4d) but leaves it up to the Member State whether to disclose or not on 
grounds of national legislation. In its justifications the European Parliament however 
expresses the hope that the Member States respect the “spirit of loyal cooperation.” The 
Council’s common position with regard to this point remains contested and unclear. The 
wording, which does not get the agreement of all Member States, provides that the Member 
State “should forward it promptly to this institution for a decision to be taken” (Council, recital 
14). 
Table 4: Status of 3rd parties according to EU-institution’s drafted positions 
  Commission  Parliament  Council 
Treatment of 3rd 
party documents 
Confidentiality is 
granted if requested 
by 3rd party 
3rd party must claim 
confidentiality on 
grounds of EU 
exceptions, institution 
decides, possibility of 
court proceeding 
Member States have 
to agree prior to the 
release 
Treatment of EU- 
documents by 3rd 
parties 
“spirit of loyalty” 
demanded, no special 
provision 
“spirit of loyalty” 
demanded, but: 
Member State takes 
the eventual decision 
Member State has to 
forward request to the 
EU-institutions for final 
decision 
 
4.3. The three proposals in terms of openness and transparency 
When assessing the three positions offered by Commission, Parliament and Council, one 
observes apparent differences in the shaping of openness and transparency. The European 
Parliament clearly takes the most far-reaching position on granting access to documents. It 
reaffirms the commitment of ready-at-hand information by introducing not only the shortest 
time limit for answering to requests. It also offers the most detailed provisions concerning 
public registers in terms of quick and extensive availability. The proposal is much more 
generous towards repeated requests than the concurrent drafts. These are treated the same 
way as all other requests. This is especially important given the aims that are to be fulfilled 
by transparency and openness. The institutionalization of a European public sphere depends 
on evolving intermediaries, which work on a regular basis. Interest groups, the media as well 20 — Cornelia Moser / How open is ‘open as possible’? — I H S 
 
as scientific research therefore need the possibility to access information without 
discrimination.  
The European Parliament’s draft is also far reaching with regard to the type of document. 
Though the relevant provisions are somehow vague, the Parliament is clearly more 
ambitious in granting access to as many documents as possible. This is especially important 
for those papers drawn up in the initial stages of the policy-making cycle. Public availability 
of internal documents allows an active participation in policy making as well as 
accompanying control thus not only relying on ex-post accountability. The proposal is firm in 
avoiding provisions, which would allow escaping from the regulation by including all three 
pillars. It therefore denies the setting up of special codes of access granting less access than 
once established. Wherever the necessity to withhold documents is conceded by its 
proposal, the Parliament urges a balancing between conflicting interests. A regular revision 
of classified documents shall moreover grant the strict commitment to the principle ‘as open 
as possible’. 
The Commission’s and the Council’s position are in contrast less open than the European 
Parliament’s, although different points are highlighted. Both grant a degree of openness and 
transparency that is not conducive to civic participation and even renders ex post 
accountability more difficult. The Commission’s proposal encompasses the existing sub-
bodies and by doing so, follows the same principles as the Parliament. In deviation from the 
Council’s position it restricts beneficiaries to legal and natural persons residing in the 
European Union and is, therefore, less open than the Council. As far as the scope of the 
future regulation is concerned, the Commission stresses the importance of granting 
confidentiality in order to ensure the effective functioning of the institutions. Internal 
documents are therefore largely covered by exceptions  restricting access. A ‘harm test’ to 
balance the applicants interest in disclosure towards the institution’s interest in confidentiality 
is in no case provided.  
The Council is even more restrictive than the Commission. The Council is less concerned 
with i nternal “space to think”-provisions but considers the confidentiality of the decision-
making process. Although a ‘harm test’ is foreseen for internal documents concerning issues 
where a decision has not yet been taken, it is restrictive in another area. It reaffirms its 
commitment to include documents of all areas but foresees at the same time special 
procedures for sensitive documents. This attitude is extended to the provisions on public 
registers. Online registers, which list all documents and provide for direct access to the 
actual paper, would enormously improve opportunities for participation and accountability 
throughout Europe. The establishment of such registers would allow individuals and interest 
groups, which are not located at Brussels to bridge the geographic distance and monitor EU 
politics. Yet, the Council neglects the European Parliament’s considerations on speedy and 
comprehensive access to registers. Even more important, it restricts the cases to be listed in 
registers therefore hampering even ex post accountability. The Council is as restricted as the I H S — Cornelia Moser / How open is ‘open as possible’? — 21 
Commission in treating repeated requests or applications for large documents in a special 
way.  
Gronbech-Jensen stresses that the Commission has adopted several measures to 
strengthen transparency since Amsterdam, e.g. by involving organized interests. By doing 
so, it went much further than the Council (Gronbech-Jensen 1998: 191). However, when 
focusing on public access to documents only, these findings have to be reconsidered. It is 
mainly the European Parliament which acts as a motor for more transparency whereas the 
Commission’s and the Council’s attitude reflect reservation on public access to documents.  
5. Conclusion 
Transparency and openness as tools for democratic legitimacy stress the  importance of 
open, simple, and comprehensible policy-making. They are seen as prerequisites to hold 
political leaders and administrative bodies accountable. Transparency and openness may 
also prompt civic participation by allowing direct engagement in politics. The most basic 
instrument to enhance transparency and openness is granting extensive access to 
information. Access to information enables citizens and civic intermediaries to scrutinize the 
political processes and to engage in them either directly or by means of public debate.  
Access to information has been one of the means designed to strengthen the legitimacy of 
the EU-polity. Since Amsterdam, this approach has been pursued and improvements in the 
information policy and accessibility of the European Union through civil society have been 
achieved.  
The final shaping of the regulation on access would be subject to yet another paper.
3 In any 
case, when studying the different suggestions on the regulation regarding public access to 
European Parliament, Council and Commission documents, current institutional views on 
transparency and openness turn out to be somehow dissatisfying. The different drafts of 
Parliament, Commission, and Council reflect the aim to protect the institution’s most vital and 
sensitive areas. The European Parliament is eager to exclude documents concerning party 
deliberations, the Commission tries to shield internal administrative documents as far as 
possible and the Council is anxious to protect its decision-making process. The comparison 
of the drafts on the European Union’s regulation on public access to European Parliament, 
Council and Commission documents shows that there is no overall perception and 
conception of democracy, and eventual compromises will continue to reflect these 
ambiguities.  
                                                 
3
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Even very open systems like the Swedish one do exclude documents from public scrutiny for 
various reasons. Taking this into account, the European Parliament’s position is still the most 
far reaching with regard to an opening up the policy-making process by means of granting 
access to documents. It suggests a speedy procedure, has no reservations on beneficiaries 
and provides for extensive access to documents in almost all phases of the policy cycle and 
in many policy fields. It is consequently outstanding in granting opportunities for both 
accountability and participation. Commission and Council, in contrast, rely more heavily on 
internal deliberations, which have to be protected up to some degree against the outside 
world. The Council even renders ex post accountability more difficult. In following the 
philosophy of diplomat’s secret deliberations, the Council provides for opportunities to hide 
the very existence of documents. Hopefully, the strengthening of the Parliament’s position 
has positive effects on better opportunities for civil society. It challenges contrasting views as 
represented by Commission and Council and may well have some impact on existing power 
relations, inherent attitudes and final political outcome.  
Transparency and openness are double-edged weapons. If people use the channels open to 
them, they may eventually conclude that they do not agree to what is going on in day-to-day 
politics. An upgrading of democratic legitimacy by granting more access to information may 
then h ave delegitimizing effects. Output-orientated approaches, stressing that democratic 
legitimacy is best achieved by providing optimal political outcome, namely rules and laws on 
behalf of the people’s demand, will remain sceptical about the positive effects of participation 
and accountability through the highest possible degree of transparency and openness. 
Conversely, one has to put up with possible unintended consequences of transparency if a 
political system is to be created as a ‘democracy by the people’ instead of a ‘democracy for 
the people’.  I H S — Cornelia Moser / How open is ‘open as possible’? — 23 
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